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Abstract
The problem addressed by this research paper is the lack of data security and privacy in
COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile applications. There have been reports of countless
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps leaking data and making use of geo location, which
has left users fearful of their data being misused. This research intends to examine and
investigate those mobile applications, their features, and their working mechanisms to
disclose potential threats to user data. In case the personal user data gets in the hands
of people with ill intentions, the data can be misused to commit illegal activities, putting
the lives and legal records of users directly in harm. Hence, this is a crucial topic to be
studied and solved in the current times. This research paper will firstly be explaining terms
like tracking and tracing in order to make the concept of these mobile applications clearer
to the readers. Additionally, this research paper will be presenting a list of all the COVID19 tracking and tracing that have been available and are active around the world,
including the USA. Furthermore, this research paper will be presenting cases of COVID19 tracking and tracing apps that have been found to have violated user privacy and data
security. Then, this research paper will be investigating the features of these faulty covid19 tracking and tracing applications for flaws that result in unauthorized data sharing.
After that, this research paper will be making educating recommendations and
suggestions to users to prevent unauthorized data sharing and disruption of their data
privacy. Lastly, this research paper will be studying multiple researches done on the same
topic previously by researchers around the world and will be providing critical review on
those research papers published before this one. By performing research on all the
previously mentioned topics, this research paper intends to contribute to the process of
solving user privacy and data security issues in COVID-19 tracking and tracing
applications.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
COVID-19 or the Corona Virus, having taken 4,173,058 recorded deaths
worldwide, has posed as the most catastrophic pandemic of the decade Worldometer,
2021). On the other hand, the pandemic caused global disruption and an economic
devastation to many sectors that have been particularly significant to suffering economies
(Zeinalipour-Yazti et al., 2020).
Along with adversities faced by the economic, health, industrial, political, and
education sector, personal-data leaks and misuse has been a prime problem faced by
technological organizations attempting to track and trace COVID-19 cases with computer
and mobile phone applications. The proposed location-based technologies in response
to COVID-19 are primarily based on the foundations of mobile commerce, encompassing
a wide range of applications that can potentially use proximity details, identity, location
data, and other condition information in the provision of value-added services to endusers (Abbas et al., 2020).
Cases have risen where COVID-19 tracking, and tracing apps have threatened the
privacy and data security rights of the users. In the process of taking information from the
users for the goal of tracking and tracing COVID-19 cases, these applications have failed
to comply with the data security and privacy laws, making it harder for the general public
to adapt to these applications.
This research paper focuses on this very issue, seeking to discover and address
cases of data security failure among covid-19 tracking and tracing apps around the world.
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The paper also reflects errors in the methods and outcomes of previous researches on
this issue, presenting a critique on previous researches.
Problem Statement
Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, Covid-19 tracing and tracking apps that utilize
patient’s sensitive data to record their health and whereabouts need to keep the data
protected and prioritize user privacy to ensure compliance to privacy laws and insure the
users from data theft.
Today, too many covid-19 tracking, and tracing apps have been flagged, reported,
and discarded for mishandling users’ personal information, while heightening fear of data
loss and theft among users. For example, a Norwegian app Smittestopp was suspended
because it was uploading live or near-live user locations as GPS coordinates to a central
server (Brewster, 2020).
According to Helpnet Security (2020), 85% of COVID-19 tracking apps leak data.
Infosecurity-magazine (2020) reports, a Dutch COVID-19 tracking app leaked 200 users’
personal data after collecting it to help the country emerge from lockdown using
widespread contact tracing. This app was among 7 apps that was shortlisted by the
government for leaking user data. Researchers discovered a flaw in the Qatar Covid-19
app that might have let hackers to access over a million people's national ID numbers
and health condition. A researcher uncovered a security flaw in India's app that allowed
him to pinpoint who was sick in specific residences (Starks et al., 2020).
Issues like these have delayed the adaptation of COVID-19 tracking and tracing
applications among the public, working against the goal of the applications in the first
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place. Applications need to be able to ensure total data security and privacy when it
comes to users’ personal data. Only then, tracking and tracing applications can be used
by the general public, contributing to the agenda of the applications to minimize direct
contact COVID-19 transmission.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
As this world is struggling to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, governments and
corporations are trying their best to come up with technologies and mobile applications
that can trace and track human contacts. Encouraged by the White House, much of that
pressure to act has focused on Silicon Valley and the tech industry, which has responded
with a fragile digital solution (Soltani et al., 2020). Digital contact tracing involves
identifying infected individuals and then tracing the people they have been in contact with
(Frith et al., 2020).
This way the government and the health agencies would be able to find if someone
has been in contact with a person with COVID-19. However, this would require fast public
adaptation to the technology and issues like low data security and privacy will only slow
down this process, as the public needs a secure system that they can adapt to. And
hundreds of scientists and researchers have signed a statement warning "mission creep"
could eventually lead to "unprecedented surveillance of society at large" (Kelion, 2020).
Therefore, it is crucial to solve the problem of low data security and privacy in COVID-19
tracking and tracing apps because this affects everyone, as everyone might have to use
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps to stay safe in the future. Data, when fallen into
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wrong hands, can result in important accounts being backed, identity theft, and various
other malpractices.
When and if wrong incidents like these take place, the public will be hesitant to
adapt to and use the new tracking and tracing apps. This will make the tougher for
policymakers to implement their tracking and tracing plans using these Hence, solving
this problem is exceedingly important.
Objective of the Study
The research primarily plans to study COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications
and find the following information:
1.

Find all the COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications that were/are used
currently around the world

2.

Investigate the COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps that were reported to have
leaked user data

3.

Research the app features for causes of data security and privacy issues in
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps

4.

Analyze previous researches done on the same topic and provide personal views
on them.

5.

Provide recommendations to protect personal data from being threatened by
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps

Study Questions/Hypotheses
Some questions that the research intends to find answers to are as follows:
i.

What are the available COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications?
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ii.

Which COVID-19 tracking/tracing apps were found to have data privacy and
security issues?

iii.

What features in the COVID-19 tracking/tracing apps are making the data
vulnerable to threats?

iv.

What researches have been done on COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps
previously?

v.

What can you do to make your data more secure and resolve data privacy issues?

Definition of Terms
Apple ID access: Permissions to access Apple iCloud account email address.
Background apps: Permissions to view all the mobile applications that are running in the
background on smartphone.
Bluetooth connection/pairing access: Permission to automatically connect to nearby
devices via Bluetooth network without user control and share data between the devices.
Camera access: Permissions to access and control the smartphone camera.
Contact information access: Permission to retrieve the phone number of the sim card
inserted in the user device.
COVID-19: COVID-19 Stands for Corona Virus Disease 2019, which is a disease caused
by a new strain of coronavirus.
Data privacy: Data Privacy describes the practices which ensure that the data shared by
customers is only used for its intended purpose.
Data Security: Data security is a set of standards and technologies that protect data from
intentional or accidental destruction, modification, or disclosure.
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Deploy: Bring into effective action; utilize.
Direct contact transmission: Direct transmission means the transmission of an infectious
agent from a reservoir to a susceptible host by direct contact or droplet spread. Direct
contact occurs through skin-to-skin contact, kissing, and sexual intercourse. Direct
contact also refers to contact with soil or vegetation harboring infectious organisms.
Discard: Get rid of (someone or something) as no longer useful or desirable.
Flag: Mark (an item) for attention or treatment in a specified way.
Full network access: Permission to view what Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular networks the
smartphone is connected to.
Geodata: Computerized geographical Data
Global positioning system (GPS): A space-based radio-navigation system consisting of a
constellation of satellites broadcasting navigation signals and a network of ground
stations and satellite control stations used for monitoring and control.
GPS: An accurate worldwide navigational and surveying facility based on the reception
of signals from an array of orbiting satellites.
Health Information access: Permission to retrieve user fitness data like heart rate, daily
footsteps, period cycle in women and so on from mobile applications like Apple Health
and Huawei Health.
ID access: Request for government ID number and information like name, address, ID
number, date of birth.
Install shortcuts access: Permission to install shortcuts of files and applications in the
smartphone storage.
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Literature: written works, especially those considered of superior or lasting merit.
Location access: Permission to turn location setting on automatically without user control
and connect the device with GPS satellite to track the exact geographical location of the
device.
Media access: Permission to access, modify and delete photos, audio, video, and text
files.
Mobile Application: A computer program or software designed to run on a mobile device
such as a phone, tablet, or watch.
Pandemic: A disease prevalent over the whole world of a whole country.
Phone call access: Permission to make phone calls and access the call contacts and
history on the smartphone.
Prevent device from sleeping access: Permission to keep the smartphone running even
when the users have preferred settings for the smartphone to shut down or turn off after
a certain period of inactivity.
Privacy: the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other
people.
Qualitative: Data that seeks to describe a topic more than measure it. For e.g., opinions,
views, and impressions.
Quantitative: Data that can be measured. For e.g., numbers, signals
Run automatically at startup access: Permission to launch the mobile application
automatically without user control when the user turns the smartphone on.
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Tracing: Measuring the distance between normal individuals and individuals infected by
COVID-19.
Tracking: Follow the course of trail of a person infected by COVID-19.
USB Storage access: Permission to access, modify and delete files stored in the
smartphone storage.
Vibration access: Permission to control the smartphone vibration settings and modify
them.
Wi-Fi access: Permission to turn on/off and connect to Wi-Fi networks through the
smartphone automatically without user control.
Summary
Since the COVID-19 pandemic started in early 2020, scientists, governments, and
tech companies have introduced numerous tracking and tracing mobile applications to
reduce direct contact transmission of the disease. However, the data collected by these
applications have left users facing a loss of privacy and insecurity with sharing their
personal data. Numerous COVID-19 apps have gotten flagged, discarded, and banned
because of privacy law violations. Multiple researches have also been done on the data
security issues in COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps.
This research paper intends to firstly, list out the tracking and tracing applications
that have been introduced to the public. Then this paper seeks to investigate the apps
with data privacy and security issues and look for the exact features of the applications
that are causing data security and privacy issues. After dissecting the features and their
effect on data security and privacy, the paper seeks to provide solutions and
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recommendations to resolve data privacy and security issues in the COVID-19
tracking/tracing apps. Lastly, this research paper analyzes previous research papers
published on the same topic and provide personal views and recommendations.

16
Chapter II: Background and review of literature
Introduction
With measures to eradicate contain the Corona Virus disease, IT companies and
government around the world have introduced mobile applications that track an individual
based on personal information like name, address, phone number and geo location that
they agree to share. However, with data sharing, came the issues of lacking data security
and data privacy. The mobile applications started employing a variety of methods,
including keeping logs of users' Global Positioning System (GPS) location data and
asking them to scan Quick Response (QR) codes, which created a fear of being tracked
and constantly followed in the application users (Kelion, 2020).
This research paper uses the data and information from articles of Literature
related to the problem and each literature article is cited and mentioned in the introduction
section, giving the intentions of the research paper a rigid form. The articles mentioned
are scholarly articles on COVID-19 tracking/tracing issues and have been verified as a
legitimate source of information. Some sources that have contributed data to this research
paper are reputed tech blogs that explain and discuss mechanisms of COVID-19 tracking
and tracing mobile applications. The section also concisely presents the significance and
importance of the chosen articles.
Moreover, the following section in this chapter-literature related to the methodology
section lists the literary articles that have contributed to the methodologies of the research
paper by providing crucial information like statistics, tables, graphs, and figures for
supporting claims made in the paper. These statistics prove that the lack of security and
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privacy in COVID-19 mobile applications is a growing problem and a massive hindrance
in the process of containing the COVID-19 disease. With corporations and governments
investing in these tracking and tracing applications to help bring down the growing
COVID-19 cases, security and privacy issues need to be addressed before the
applications are deployed among the public. Only then the plan to solve the issue of
growing COVID-19 cases will start to move ahead towards success.
Lastly, the summary section sums up the chapter, giving the readers a condensed
extract of the highlights of the chapter. Although data and statistics are present in the
portions mentioned earlier in this section, the summary section gives the readers a quick
overview of the claims and conclusions provided by the sections in the chapter.
The aforementioned sections of the chapter build a strong and robust base that
the research paper is built on. The contents of this chapter make a clear and
comprehensible map of the research paper. As we go further in the research paper, the
information and findings are found to be connected and in context with the details
mentioned in this chapter.
Background Related to the Problem
According to World health Organization (2020), COVID-19 or the Corona Virus
disease is caused by SARS-COV2 and has been the cause of over 1 million recorded
fatalities with over 39 million cases worldwide in the year 2020. Claimed to have originated
in the wet animal markets in Wuhan City, China, the COVID-19 outbreak infected a
massive chunk of the world population in a matter of months, person-to-person
transmission being the primary mode of transmission. Then, extensive measures to

18
minimize person-to-person transmission of COVID-19 was enforced to restrict
transmission. This is when mobile app companies introduced the COVID-19 tracking and
tracing apps as health tools to assist health officials to track down exposures after an
infected individual are identified. Using GPS location on phones and personal information
for identification, these apps have been able to track and trace COVID-19 patients,
however, crucial consumer privacy and data security issues exist with these
tracking/tracing apps. This paper discusses these data security and privacy issues in
detail in its latter sections.
Data security and privacy refers to the right of an individual to have their personal
data like address, phone number, social security number and location confidential.
According to Cliqz.com, in terms of COVID apps, tracking means determining a
person’s current location using geodata (GPS), whereas tracing means measuring the
distance of phones to record physical contacts between people (Greif, 2020). In other
words, tracking constantly transmits an individual’s current location, while tracing records
how close has an individual come to a COVID-19 patient physically.
Soon after the governments of different countries deployed COVID-19 tracking and
tracing apps, privacy and data security concerns started rising. For example, On March
20, 2020, the Singaporean Ministry of Health released the TraceTogether app for Android
and IOS (Cho et al., 2020). The app was found to be providing little to no privacy for
infected individuals, as infected individuals were compelled to release their personal data.
Information like the person’s name, location, contact number, and health information
could be in threat, as a snooper or someone with the authority could misuse it.
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To name some COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications, COVID-19 Gov PK
(Pakistan), Health Canada (Canada), COVID-19 DXB (Dubai), Covid (Qatar) and Beware
Bahrain (Bahrain) are among countless Covid-19 contact tracing applications that
governments all around the world have brought into use (Azad et al, 2020). Many of these
applications are found to have requested access to location, mobile network, media,
prevent from sleeping, camera, microphone, and even device ID. Given that contact
tracing and tracking mobile applications are one of the most popular ways of preventing
direct contact transmission from COVID, data security and privacy issues need to be
examined and resolved.
Data security and privacy could leave people fearful of adapting the new
applications, which would dismantle the goal of the governments to stabilize growing
COVID-19 cases. This research paper intends to study the information and data security
features of apps like TraceTogether and make strategic recommendations to protect the
data better.
Literature Related to the Problem
In the Qatar Covid-19 app, researchers found a vulnerability that would’ve let
hackers obtain more than a million people’s national ID numbers and health status. In
India’s tracking app, a researcher discovered a security gap that allowed him to determine
who was sick in individual homes. North Dakota conceded in May that its smartphone
app, Care19, had been sending user location data to the digital marketing service
Foursquare (Starks et al, 2020).
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A simulation on one million people found that 80% of smartphone users in the UK
(56% of the general population) would need to install a contact-tracing app to suppress
the epidemic effectively. A survey run in five countries with more than 6000 potential app
users suggested that lower numbers would install a similar app (73.6% of users in the
UK, and 67.5–85.5% in France, Germany, Italy, and the USA). In Singapore, the first
country to deploy a voluntary contact-tracing app (TraceTogether), launched in March,
only an estimated 17% of the population installed the app. After a spike in new cases in
April, the city-state introduced a lockdown named ‘circuit breaker’ (Lapolla et al, 2020).
Covid-19 tracking, and tracing applications have been a prime approach deployed by
governments in past and the future to achieve containment of the COVID-19 disease.
However, tracking and tracing applications have failed to secure user data, leaving the
government and the users completely fearful of their misuse.
Incidents above prove that the lack of data security and data privacy is a whole
issue in its own under the COVID-19 pandemic umbrella, affecting users firstly by
inducing fear of data leaks and then by preventing them from adapting to COVID-19
tracking and tracing applications. Besides individuals, this issue has also been a
roadblock in the governments’ plans to deploy technological tools like mobile applications
to fight the pandemic. Therefore, publishing research papers that dissect the issue of low
data security in COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications is very crucial. Lack of
research and research papers will leave the public firstly unaware of the issue, and
secondly powerless against the issue.

21
Publishing literature that explains the issue and recommend ways to minimize or
eventually remove it will not only help the users adapt to the new COVID-19 tracking and
tracing applications, but also help the health agencies smoothly implement their plans to
tackle COVID-19 pandemic by using tracking and tracing mobile applications.
Literature Related to the Methodology
To reach its goals, the research paper utilizes information presented by some
scholarly researches performed on the exact or similar topics. Researches that have been
performed by scholars from the most competent reputable makes a great source of idea,
knowledge, and update on the issue in hand. These research literatures are also a great
milestone in the process of solving the data security and privacy issue with COVID-19
applications. Some of these literatures are mentioned below.
Firstly, online forums like Cliqz have been cited and reviewed in order to make the
readers familiar with the concepts of tracking and tracing and know their differences. An
article named – Corona App: What’s the Difference Between Tracking and Tracing has
been used to lay out the foundation for this paper, as it explains what is tracking, tracing
and how each of these features in a mobile application work to meet their goals and
intentions. This will give the research a clear view ahead (Kelion, 2020).
After that, a research paper named- A First Look at Privacy Analysis of COVID-19
Contact Tracing Mobile Applications by Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Junaid Arshad, Syed
Muhammad Ali Akmal, Farhan Riaz, Sidrah Abdullah, Muhammad Imran and Farhan
Ahmad has been reviewed and cited. This paper does a remarkable job at breaking down
how COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps work and what mobile features they make use
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of while working. This paper explains mobile communication mechanisms like Bluetooth
and geo location that COVID-19 applications use to track and trace COVID-19 cases
(Azad et al., 2020).
Then, Contract Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and
Related Trade-offs by Hyunghoon Cho, Daphne Ippolito, and Yun William Yu does a great
job at describing the privacy rights that consumers have to give up while using COVID19 tracking and tracing apps (Cho et al., 2020). They use the example of TraceTogether
application deployed by the Singaporean government and explain in detail the threats on
personal consumer data. However, Contract Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy
Considerations and Related Trade-offs covers the case of a single COVID-19
tracking/tracing application used by the Singaporean government. Different COVID-19
tracking, and tracing applications might have different features causing the loss of data
privacy in various ways. Therefore, more literatures need to be examined and studied in
order to reach the heart of this issue.
A Study of the Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps by Haohuang Wen,
Qingchuan Zhao, Zhiqiang, Dong Xuan, and Ness Shroff throws light on the lack of
privacy on COVID-19 tracing apps by studying 41 total released COVID-19 tracking and
tracking applications (Wen et al., 2020). The article also breaks down the types of tracking
and tracing and their data requirements. This is a great study in terms of coverage of
COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications, as it covers not just 1 but 41 applications in
total, giving the readers an idea about the general and individual effects of the features
of these COVID-19 tracking/tracing applications.
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Furthermore, to back the claims with appropriate and credible statistics on COVID19 tracking and tracing mobile applications, an article named- Data Privacy Issues in
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps from the tach blog- Morgan Lewis has been utilized
(Dudkewitz et al., 2020). As no claim is complete without a robust base if statistics and
numbers, this article has been used as a source of data extracted from a survey of 50
COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications all around the world.
Summary
COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications, although considered an effective tool
for locating the whereabouts of COVID-19 patients, have brought about data security and
privacy risks that has caused delay in their adaptation by the public. Since it is the age of
technology advancement, the introduction of COVID-19 tracking, and tracing apps is a
remarkable medium to bring about containment of the disease. However, at what cost?
The application Tracetogether by the Singaporean government, and many others
alike have, in efforts to track and trace COVID-19 cases, caused the users’ right to privacy
and security by recording crucial entities like the current location, personal contact
number, personal address, government identification numbers, birth dates, and age.
Numerous COVID-19 tracking, and tracing applications have been reported to
extract sensitive data like location and personal address of users that would allow the
mobile application companies to exactly pinpoint the location of an individual. Regardless
of the motive of the applications.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
In Chapter III of the research project, the tools utilized in order to carry out this
research and get the desired outcomes will be listed. These mentioned tools and
techniques, in varying levels, are used for the purpose of finding data, shaping data, and
finally presenting the data that ultimately answers the questions asked in the previous
chapters of this research paper.
Every research requires a set of technical and non-technical skills that aid in driving
the results intended by the research. The choice of these technical and non-technical
skills needs to be made carefully as the use of wrong or unfit tools in relation to the desired
outcomes of the research. Likewise, this research of COVID-19 tracking, and tracing
applications has its own set of these tools that will be mentioned and described in detail
in the following parts of this chapter.
In the process of researching the lack of data security and privacy in COVID-19
tracking and tracing applications, firstly, all the COVID-19 tracking, and tracing
applications need to be listed out in order to acknowledge the readers about the available
options out there. Then, the COVID-19 apps that have been reported to found to have
threatened users’ privacy and data security need to be filtered out and listed. After that,
the defective COVID-19 tracking, and tracing applications are to be examined and those
features need to be found that have been causing the lack of data security and privacy.
Lastly, some educated recommendations are to be given in order to mitigate and minimize
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the problem of lacking data security and privacy. Lastly, some previous researches are
to be analyzed and their short comings pointed out.
To generate the intended results, the research utilizes the quantitative and
qualitative data from several scholarly articles and research papers from legitimate and
reported sources.
Design of the Study
To generate the intended results, the research utilizes the quantitative and
qualitative data from several scholarly articles and research papers from legitimate and
reported sources. The research will undertake both qualitative and quantitative approach
to find answers required by the paper.
Qualitative and quantitative and the two natures of approaches used in research,
and it is firmly believed that research isn’t complete without being speculated and
analyzed by the use of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to bring about a
conclusion. Similarly, the use of qualitative results without a measure of the quantitative
metrics results in the outcomes being short on logic. Therefore, both qualitative and
quantitative approaches are utilized in the research in a manner that they complement
their respective outcomes.
For finding answers to questions like the list and number of COVID-19 tracking
and tracing applications, number of applications reported for lack of data security and
privacy, and location where the applications were deployed, quantitative research will be
used. For finding answers to questions like features that cause lack of data security and
privacy and recommendations, qualitative research will be exercised.
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Data Collection
The research primarily intends to list out the most used COVID-19 tracking and
tracing applications. Then it intends to mention the COVID-19 applications that have been
flagged or highlighted on News platforms for being a victim of data breaches and leaks.
After that, the research intends to look closer into these COVID-19 tracking and tracing
applications to find the weak links on the user end that might make them vulnerable to
threats. Then, this research intends to make educated and researched suggestions to the
app users for keeping their personal data safe and their privacy unthreatened. Lastly this
paper intends to find more research done on the topic before it and present their
summary, strengths, and weaknesses. Answers to all these questions were researched
with the help of different platforms on the internet.
Firstly, the list of COVID-19 tracking, and tracing applications was researched by
Google searches, which gave numerous results ranging from research papers, news
articles, mobile application developer websites, and government statistics that enlisted
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps deployed in regions all over the world. This greatly
helped in building the list of 100 COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications from all
around the world.
Secondly, a search of research papers and reputed cybersecurity News platforms
like Help Net Security presented information about the COVID-19 tracking and tracing
applications that were flagged or highlighted due to threats like data leaks and breaches.
Then, mobile app platforms like Google Play store and Apple App Store, where all
the COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile applications are downloaded from. Google and
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Apple are the biggest markets for mobile phones applications, and On April 10, 2020,
Google and Apple announced their alliance, stating that they are working together in the
"spirit of collaboration" to "allow the use of Bluetooth technology to help governments and
health organizations decrease the spread of the virus (Michael et al., 2020). These mobile
application platforms have written details about the permissions and access that the
mobile applications request once downloaded on smartphones. Depending on the
permissions and access, these mobile applications can control or modify files and
features in a smartphone. These sources provided the mobile application details that the
research intends to uncover.
After that, research papers and scholarly articles written by qualified scholars
around the world were analyzed and studied, along with the aforementioned data, to
make the suggestions and recommendations to mobile app users in order for them to
protect their data and personal information from being accessed, controlled, or modified
by the COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications.
Tools and Techniques
Every research needs tools and techniques for analyzing the data and coming up
with conclusions that strengthen the research and help meet its goals. Similarly, this
research paper also used some tools and techniques that helps in finding the right and
reliable information from the internet and extracting it to use it in the paper.
Firstly, in order to make sure that the data that has been extracted is reliable and
has a highly credible and reputed source, we use “www.scholar.google.com”, where only

28
research papers from researchers at highly reputed universities are posted. This way we
ensure the quality of the information that we use is high.
Secondly, we use specific keywords while searching for the data to ensure that the
search results match our needs and can easily be articulated into our research paper. We
use keywords like “COVID 19-tracking and tracing”, “data leak and loss of privacy in
COVID-19 tracking and tracing”. This allows us to find only the articles that can potentially
contribute to our research paper.
To be specific about the goals of this research and the methods to achieve them,
the following approaches are used:
Question: What are the available COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications?
Method: The available COVID-19 tracking, and tracing applications are researched by
looking for COVID-19 mobile applications list on Google.
Question: Which COVID-19 tracking/tracing apps were found to have data privacy and
security issues?
Method: The COVID-19 tracking/tracing applications that were reported to have privacy
and security issues, and data leaking issues will be investigated using credible blogs as
well as scholarly articles on Google as a source.
Question: What data and information are COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications
accessing from user devices?
Method: This will be investigated by looking closely into the features of COVID-19
tracking/tracing applications by either going to their website or searching for data access
permissions.
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Question: What researches have been done on COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps
previously?
Method: The previous researches performed on the similar topic will again be looked for
by searching for scholarly articles by google, reading them, and then checking to see if
the questions they answer completely contribute to the investigation and resolution of the
lack of data privacy and security in COVID-19 tracking/tracing applications.
Question: How can users keep their data safe and protect their privacy from COVID-19
tracking and tracing applications?
Method: Recommendations and advice on making user data more secure in COVID-19
tracking/tracing mobile applications will be researched by studying scholarly articles on
Google.
By following the above methods, the questions mentioned previously about the lack of
data security and privacy in COVID-19 mobile applications are intended to be answered.
Furthermore, News and other forms of media like videos on YouTube will be made use
of to mention updates and progresses in the respective subject of the research paper.
Hardware and Software Environment
In order to proceed towards the results of this research paper, a number of software
platforms and hardware devices have been utilized.
Below is a list of hardware and software components used during the research:
Hardware:
1.

A computer with a memory of above 64GB to save the files required for the
research paper
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2.

Webcam on the computer for video-calling and meeting the research advisor for
guidance on the research

3.

Hard disk to save the necessary research files for backup

Software:
1.

Microsoft Word to type the research paper

2.

Google Chrome to search scholarly articles and blog articles on Google

3.

Zoom video calling application to meet with the research advisor for guidance on
the research paper

4.

Zotero to keep track of all the required articles and blogs and cite them

5.

Microsoft Project to create a Gant Chart to track the research progress

Summary
Chapter III titled Methodology went into details regarding the methods used to
achieve the results as intended by the research paper. It included a thorough description
of the nature of the approach – qualitative and quantitative, along with the reasons they
were used as a combination. Moreover, this chapter explained the data collection
methods that were used in the research paper to find the information required to answer
the questions and draw the conclusions in this research paper. Each question was
answered using the information collected from varying platforms on the internet like
Google Play store, Apple Appstore, Google Scholar, News platforms like Help Net
Security and scholarly articles. The significance and the nature of data retrieved from
these sources were clearly described in Chapter III. Lastly, the method used for
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quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to achieve the results were explained in detail
in this chapter. The tools inside the methods were clearly highlighted and their outcomes
were distinguished to portray their importance in achieving the results in this research
paper.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
After describing the research topic, research methods, research questions,
research timeline, and research structure, the paper has finally reached Chapter IV where
the data that has been researched is presented. After following various qualitative as well
as quantitative research methods over countless articles, research papers, News portals,
and cybersecurity blogs, a huge amount of data has been found and compiled, that helped
the paper answer the questions it intends to.
Firstly, the chapter presents answers for the first question with A list of COVID-19
apps used around the world. The list comprises of a 100 COVID-19 tracking and tracing
mobile apps that were used by millions of smartphone users around the world in order to
be alerted of COVID-19 infection cases nearby.
Secondly, the chapter presents answers to the second question with a short list of
COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps that were flagged or highlighted on the news for
leaking personal user data or been a victim of data breaches.
Then, this chapter presents answers to the third research question with a detailed
description of the access permissions that each COVID-19 tracking, or tracing app asks
the users for. This discloses the data in user devices that the applications can access,
edit, or delete after the users agree to their terms and conditions. This clarifies ways the
mobile applications could threated user privacy.
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After the presentation of the aforementioned data, the remaining two questions of
this research will be answered in the next section along with a detailed analysis of the
data presented in this chapter.
Data Presentation
Following the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of the year 2020, governments
and technology companies from around the world began utilizing the most advanced
methods in technology in order to track and trace COVID-19 infection cases. Here is a list
of a 100 COVID-19 mobile applications and the region they are published and used in.
Table 1
List of COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications and their region
No.

App Name

Region

1 TraceTogether

Singapore

2 CUIDAR COVID-19

Argentina

3 Stopp Corona

Austria

4 EHTERAZ app

Qatar

5 ABTraceTogether

Canada

6 Care 19

USA

7 Private Kit

USA

8 COVID Control

Maryland, USA

9 Hamagen

Israel

10 Corona Data Donation

Germany
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Table 1 (Continued)
11 Stay Home Safe

Hong Kong

12 COVIDsafe

Australia

13 BlueZone

Vietnam

14 CA Notify

California, USA

15 COVIDWISE

USA

16 Guidesafe

Alabama, USA

17 Covid Trace Nevada

Nevada, USA

18 CO Exposure Notifications

Colorado, USA

19 COVID Alert CT

Connecticut, USA

20 DC CAN

DC, USA

21 Guam Covid Alert

Guam

22 AlohaSafe Alert

Hawaii, USA

23 MD Covid Alert

Maryland, USA

24 MI Covid Alert

Michigan, USA

25 COVIDawareMN

Minnesota, USA

26 WI Exposure Notification

Nevada, USA

27 Covid Alert NJ

New Jersey, USA

28 Covid Alert NY

New York, USA

29 SlowCovidNC

North Carolina, USA

30 Care19 Diary

North Dakota, USA
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31 Care19 Alert

North Dakota, USA

32 Oregon Exposure Notifications*

Oregon, USA

33 Covid Alert PA

Pennsylvania, USA

34 Rastrea el Virus

Puerto Rico, USA

35 Crush Covid RI

Rhode Island, USA

36 South Carolina Safer Together*

South Carolina, USA

37 WA Notify

Washington, USA

38 UT Exposure Notification

Utah, USA

39 BeAware Bahrain

Bahrain

40 ViruSafe

Bulgaria

Chinese Health Code System,
China
41 jiangkangbao
42 CoronApp

Columbia

43 CovTracer

Cyprus

44 eRouska

Czech

45 StopCovid

Georgia, USA

46 GH COVID-19 Tracker

Ghana

47 Rakning C-19

Iceland

48 Aarogya Setu

India

49 Sarthak

Indonesia

50 TousAnti Covid

France

36

Table 1 (Continued)
51 Smittestop

Denmark

52 SwissCovid

Switzerland

53 COCOA

Japan

54 Immuni

France

55 Nepal COVID-19 Surveillance

Nepal

56 Coronavirus UY

Uruguay

57 NICD COVID-19 Case Investigation

South Africa

58 COVA Punjab

Punjab

59 SOS Corona

Mali

60 Bolivia Segura

Bolivia

61 Hamro Swasthya

Nepal

62 Coronavirus – SUS

Brazil

63 NHS Test and Tracing app

UK

64 TraceCORONA

Germany

65 Vietnam Health Declaration

Vietnam

66 CoronaReport

Austria

67 Corona Warn App

Germany

68 StopTheSpread COVID-19

UK

69 Traze

Philippines

70 STOP COVID19 CAT

Catalonia
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71 CG Covid-19 ePass

India

72 MySejahtera

Malaysia

73 Covid Alert

Canada

74 COVID19 - DXB Smart App

Dubai

75 HOIA

Estonia

76 CareFiji

Fiji

77 Koronavilkku

Finland

78 TousAntiCovid

France

79 Beat Covid Gibraltar

Gibraltar

80 VirusRadar

Hungary

81 Tawakkalna

Saudi Arabia

82 Tabaud

Saudi Arabia

83 Shlonik

Kuwait

84 NZ COVID Tracer

New Zealand

85 E7mi

Tunisia

86 Corona Tracer BD

Bangladesh

87 DOCANDU Covid Checker

Greece

88 NM Notify

New Mexico, USA

89 ASI

Ecuador

90 Guidesafe

Alabama, USA

38

Table 1 (Continued)
91 COVID Defense

Louisiana, USA

92 Covid Watch Arizona

Arizona, USA

93 Covid Alert DE

Delaware, USA

94 Mass Notify

Massachussets, USA

95 ROBERT

France

96 Blue Care

Louisiana, USA

97 CombatCOVID PBC

Florida, USA

98 COVID Coach

USA

99 VirusMapBR

Brazil

100 Canada COVID-19

Canada

Regardless of the difference between national development in the countries and
regions mentioned in the table above, the method of tracking and tracing COVID-19 cases
by using mobile applications is seen as a popular one all over the world. This also means
that people from all over the world are exposed to mobile applications that track and trace
COVID-19 cases, and in case of fraudulent attacks, and weak mobile application security
systems, people from all parts of the world are equally at risk of having their privacy.
COVID-19 applications in news for data breach
Since the start of the pandemic and the rise of COVID-19 tracking and tracing
mobile applications, countless companies have taken part in the race of publishing the
best tracking and tracing mobile application. However, there are also many covid 19
tracking mobile application companies that did not have the best security frameworks in
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their mobile applications, because of which they became victims of deadly cyber-attacks
that resulted in their data being exposed and stolen. This directly threatened the privacy
of their users and put them at risk. On the other hand, many app companies themselves
did not make customer data privacy their top priority and ended up misusing users’
personal data. Covid-19 tracking and tracing mobile applications that were under highlight
in media for these negative incidents are mentioned below.
TraceTogether app, Singapore: Launched in March 2020 in Singapore,
TraceTogether creators were found to be sharing its users’ personal data with the Police
Department of the nation for the purpose of criminal investigations, which caused massive
opposition and boycotting from its users in Singapore (Han, 2021).
Ehteraz app, Qatar: In May 2020, a serious security vulnerability in Qatar’s
mandatory contact tracing app Ehteraz that was although found and fixed quickly, could
have caused a leak of millions of users’ personal data if exploited by attackers (Amnesty
International, 2020).
COVIDSafe app, Australia: In November 2020, Australia’s spy agencies were
caught collecting users’ COVID-19 data by government watch dogs. Although the spy
agencies disclosed that they were taking steps to ensure compliance and that the user
data would be deleted as soon as practicable, this incident caused a loss of users’ trust
in the COVID-19 app (Whittaker, 2020).
Care19 diary app, North and South Dakota, USA: In May 2020, Care19 diary app
popular in South and North Dakota region in the USA was found to be sharing location
and health data with a third-party digital marketing company – Foursquare (Fowler, 2020).
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Chinese Health Code System – jiangkangbao, China: In January 2021, the
Chinese government’s mandatory Covid-19 app was found to have multiple leaks of
users’ data like names, addresses, phone numbers and other personal information,
causing celebrity personal information to be auctioned on the internet and backlash from
the users (Xue, 2021).
COVID-19 tracking/tracing applications and their data access permissions
Each application that is available for users to download have their own website
section or section in Apple App Store/Google Playstore that lists out the data and features
that the respective application will be accessing or modifying in the users’ smartphones.
Upon closely speculating each of the COVID-19 mobile application’s download page, we
found details of the data access permissions that the applications will be accessing or
modifying in the smart phones.
The data permissions that the mobile applications request fall among one or more
of these permissions below. The meanings behind these access permissions are as
follows:
Bluetooth connection/pairing: Permission to automatically connect to nearby devices via
Bluetooth network without user control and share data between the devices.
Location: Permission to turn location setting on automatically without user control and
connect the device with GPS satellite to track the exact geographical location of the
device.
Contact information: Permission to retrieve the phone number of the sim card inserted in
the user device.
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ID: Request for government ID number and information like name, address, ID number,
date of birth.
Apple ID: Permissions to access Apple iCloud account email address.
Health Information: Permission to retrieve user fitness data like heart rate, daily footsteps,
period cycle in women and so on from mobile applications like Apple Health and Huawei
Health.
Media: Permission to access, modify and delete photos, audio, video, and text files.
USB Storage: Permission to access, modify and delete files stored in the smartphone
storage.
Background apps: Permissions to view all the mobile applications that are running in the
background on smartphone.
Camera: Permissions to access and control the smartphone camera.
Wi-Fi: Permission to turn on/off and connect to Wi-Fi networks through the smartphone
automatically without user control.
Full network access: Permission to view what Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular networks the
smartphone is connected to.
Run automatically at startup: Permission to launch the mobile application automatically
without user control when the user turns the smartphone on.
Prevent device from sleeping: Permission to keep the smartphone running even when the
users have preferred settings for the smartphone to shut down or turn off after a certain
period of inactivity.
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Phone call: Permission to make phone calls and access the call contacts and history on
the smartphone.
Install shortcuts: Permission to install shortcuts of files and applications in the smartphone
storage.
Vibration: Permission to control the smartphone vibration settings and modify them.
Unclear: Either have not disclosed or have written that the application does not access
any data in the smartphone.
In order to get the information about what data and phone features the COVID-19
tracking and tracing apps are accessing, users can go to Google Play store, and Apple
Appstore pages as shown below to find the information. The area highlighted with red
lines is the section where users can check the privacy policies and app permissions for
the tracking and tracing mobile applications.

Figure 1
Apple Appstore page for Covid Defense App
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Figure 2
Google Play store page for Covid Defense App

Table 2
List of COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications and their access permissions
No.

App Name

Data and features access required

1

TraceTogether

Mobile number, ID

2

CUIDAR COVID-19

Apple ID, Health Information, Contact information

Table 2 (Continued)
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3

Stopp Corona

Apple ID, Health Information, Contact information

4

EHTERAZ app

Location, contact information, ID

5

ABTraceTogether

Location, contact information

6

Care 19

Unclear

7

Private Kit

Unclear

8

COVID Control

Location, Media, Files, USB storage
Background apps, Location, Wi-Fi, Network access,
Bluetooth, Alarm, prevent device from sleeping, Run

9

Hamagen
at startup,
Vibration

10

Corona Data Donation

ID, address, contact information
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,

11

Stay Home Safe
prevent device from sleeping
Location Bluetooth, Network access, run at startup,

12

COVIDsafe
prevent device from sleeping
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
prevent device from sleeping, USB storage, Install

13

BlueZone
shortcuts,
Run at startup, Running apps, Media
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

14

CA Notify
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup

Table 2 (Continued)
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Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

15

COVIDWISE
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

16

Guidesafe
automatically at startup
Running apps, full network access, prevent device

17

Covid Trace Nevada

from sleep, run automatically at startup, network
access

CO Exposure

Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

Notifications

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup

18

Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent
19

COVID Alert CT
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

20

DC CAN
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

21

Guam Covid Alert
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

22

AlohaSafe Alert
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

23

MD Covid Alert
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

24

MI Covid Alert
automatically at startup

Table 2 (Continued)
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Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

25

COVIDawareMN
automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

26

WI Exposure Notification
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Buetooth pairing, full network access, run

27

Covid Alert NJ
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

28

Covid Alert NY
automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

29

SlowCovidNC
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Location, full network access, prevent device from

30

Care19 Diary
sleeping
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

31

Care19 Alert
automatically at startup
Oregon Exposure

Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

Notifications*

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup

32

Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run
33

Covid Alert PA
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

34

Rastrea el Virus
automatically at startup

Table 2 (Continued)
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Location, full network access, prevent device from

35

Crush Covid RI
sleeping
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent
South Carolina Safer

36

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
Together*
control vibration
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

37

WA Notify

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

38

UT Exposure Notification

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration
Running apps, Calendar, Camera, USB storage, full

39

BeAware Bahrain

network access, prevent device from sleep, run
automatically at startup, network access
Location, full network access, prevent device from

40

ViruSafe
sleeping
Chinese Health Code

41

Health information, Contact information, ID
System, jiangkangbao
Phone call, contacts, ID, Location, Bluetooth access,

42

CoronApp
network access, automatically run at. Startup, alarm

Table 2 (Continued)
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Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run
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CovTracer
automatically at startup, prevent from sleeping
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

44

eRouska
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent
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StopCovid
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
prevent device from sleeping, USB storage, Install

46

GH COVID-19 Tracker
shortcuts,
Run at startup, Running apps, Media
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

47

Rakning C-19
automatically at startup
Location, Camera, Bluetooth, Network access, run at

48

Aarogya Setu
startup, prevent device from sleeping
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
prevent device from sleeping, USB storage, Install

49

Sarthak
shortcuts,
Run at startup, Running apps, Media
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,

50

TousAnti Covid

prevent device from sleeping, USB storage, Install
shortcuts, R
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un at startup, Running apps, Media
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

51

Smittestop
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

52

SwissCovid
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

53

COCOA
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

54

Immuni
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Nepal COVID-19

Location Bluetooth, Network access, run at startup,

Surveillance

prevent device from sleeping

55

Wi-Fi, Location, Camera, Phone call, Microphone,
56

Coronavirus UY

Bluetooth, prevent device from sleeping, Media,
Network access

NICD COVID-19 Case
57

Unclear
Investigation
Wi-Fi, USB Storage, Location, Camera, Files, ID,
Phone call, App history, Bluetooth, prevent device

58

COVA Punjab
from sleeping,
Audio settings, Network access, Vibration
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Wi-Fi, USB Storage, Location, Camera, Files, ID,
Phone call, App history, Bluetooth, prevent device
59

SOS Corona
from sleeping,
Network access, Vibration, Media

60

Bolivia Segura

ID, Location, Full network access, phone call
Wi-Fi, USB Storage, Location, Camera, Files, ID,
Bluetooth, prevent device from sleeping, Network

61

Hamro Swasthya
access, Vibration,
Media
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

62

Coronavirus – SUS
automatically at startup
NHS Test and Tracing

63

Health information, Location, Contact information, ID
app

64

TraceCORONA

Unclear
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,

Vietnam Health

prevent device from sleeping, USB storage, Run at

Declaration

startup,

65

Running apps, Media
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration, prevent device
66

CoronaReport

from sleeping, USB storage, run at startup, Running
apps,
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Media
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
67

Corona Warn App

prevent device from sleeping, run at startup, Running
apps, Media

StopTheSpread COVID68

Unclear
19
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,

69

Traze

prevent device from sleeping, run at startup, Running
apps, Media
Location Bluetooth, Network access, run at startup,

70

STOP COVID19 CAT
prevent device from sleeping
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
prevent device from sleeping, run at startup, Running

71

CG Covid-19 ePass
apps, Media,
USB Storage
Camera, Phone call, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location,
Vibration, prevent device from sleeping, Run at

72

MySejahtera
startup,
Running apps, Media, USB Storage

Table 2 (Continued)
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Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
prevent device from sleeping, run at startup, Running

73

Covid Alert
apps, Media,
USB Storage
Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Location, Vibration,
COVID19 – DXB Smart

Calendar, Microphone, prevent device from sleeping,

App

Run at startup,

74

Running apps, Media, USB Storage
Wi-Fi, Buetooth pairing, full network access, run
75

HOIA
automatically at startup
Location Bluetooth, Network access, run at startup,

76

CareFiji
prevent device from sleeping

77

Koronavilkku

78

TousAntiCovid

Bluetooth, prevent device from sleeping, vibration
Camera, Wi-Fi, Network access, Bluetooth, run at
startup, vibration, prevent device from sleeping
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

79

Beat Covid Gibraltar
automatically at startup
Location, full network access, prevent device from

80

VirusRadar
sleeping, Bluetooth access
Camera, Files, Media, Location, Bluetooth, run at

81

Tawakkalna
startup, Network access, Vibration
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Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent
82

Tabaud

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration
Wi-Fi, USB Storage, Location, Camera, Files, ID,
Phone call, App history, Microphone, Bluetooth,

83

Shlonik
Prevent device from sleeping, Audio settings,
Network access, Vibration
Camera, Wi-Fi, Network access, Bluetooth, run at

84

NZ COVID Tracer
startup, vibration, prevent device from sleeping
Location, Phone call, Bluetooth, run at startup,

85

E7mi
prevent device from sleeping, network access
Location, Phone call, Device ID, ID, Bluetooth, run at

86

Corona Tracer BD

startup, prevent device from sleeping, network
access

DOCANDU Covid
87

Location, USB storage, Media
Checker
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

88

NM Notify

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration
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Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent
89

ASI

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

90

Guidesafe
automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

91

COVID Defense
automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

92

Covid Watch Arizona
device from sleeping, run automatically at startup
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, full network access, run

93

Covid Alert DE
automatically at startup
Bluetooth pairing, full network access, prevent

94

Mass Notify

device from sleeping, run automatically at startup,
control vibration

95

ROBERT

Bluetooth, prevent device from sleeping, vibration

96

Blue Care

Location, running apps

97

CombatCOVID PBC

Location, full network access, prevent device from
sleeping, Bluetooth access
Contacts, Microphone, Storage USB, Media, Files,
98

COVID Coach

Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Run at startup,
Prevent device from sleeping
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ID, Health information, Bluetooth, Location, Wi-Fi,
99

VirusMapBR
Data usage, Media
Location, Health information, Search history, ID,

100 Canada COVID-19
Bluetooth, Data usage, Network access

The data permission accesses for the COVID-19 mobile applications give you an
idea about what data you are potentially putting at risk when you install the applications.
Hence, it is crucial to check their app page for these permissions to be on the safe side
and not risk data and information in your smartphones that could be used by individuals
or organizations with ill intentions to leak, modify, delete, or steal.
Other research done on data privacy in COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps
A First Look at Privacy Analysis of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Mobile Applications
by Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Junaid Arshad, Syed Muhammad Ali Akmal, Farhan Riaz,
Sidrah Abdullah, Muhammad Imran and Farhan Ahmad does a remarkable job at
breaking down how COVID-19 tracking and tracing apps work and what mobile features
they make use of while working (Azad et al., 2020). This paper explains mobile
communication mechanisms like Bluetooth and geo location that COVID-19 applications
use to track and trace COVID-19 cases. However, only 13 mobile applications have been
examined for their working mechanisms, while there are over 100 mobile applications that
access different data from users’ phones. Therefore, more mobile applications need to
be studied to come to strong conclusions regarding data privacy in COVID-19 mobile
applications.
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Contract Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related
Trade-offs by Hyunghoon Cho, Daphne Ippolito, and Yun William Yu does a great job at
describing the privacy rights that consumers have to give up while using COVID-19
tracking and tracing apps (Cho et al., 2020). They use the example of TraceTogether
application deployed by the Singaporean government and explain in detail the threats on
personal consumer data. However, Contract Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy
Considerations and Related Trade-offs covers the case of a single COVID-19
tracking/tracing application used by the Singaporean government. Different COVID-19
tracking, and tracing applications might have different features causing the loss of data
privacy in various ways. Therefore, more COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile
applications need to be examined and studied in order to reach the heart of this issue.
A Study of the Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps by Haohuang Wen,
Qingchuan Zhao, Zhiqiang, Dong Xuan, and Ness Shroff focuses on the lack of privacy
on COVID-19 tracing apps by studying 41 total released COVID-19 tracking and tracking
applications (Wen et al., 2020). The article also breaks down the types of tracking and
tracing and their data requirements. This is a great study in terms of coverage of COVID19 tracking and tracing applications, as it covers not just 1 but 41 applications in total,
giving the readers an idea about the general and individual effects of the features of these
COVID-19 tracking/tracing applications.
Data Analysis
In the previous section of this chapter, the data and information that was retrieved
from numerous sources concerning cybersecurity and COVID-19 tracking and tracing
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applications was presented. The data showed the list of COVID-19 applications, their
regions of usage, and the data permissions that they ask for to the users who use those
applications. In the Data Analysis section, that information and data from the previous
section are analyzed and some statistical calculations performed on them to deduce what
they mean in detail. A table that enumerates the number of mobile applications and the
access to features they request has been provided below.
Table 3
Permission accesses and the number of applications
Number of mobile
SN

Feature

applications

1 Bluetooth connection/pairing

78

2 Location tracking

42

3 Contact information

10

4 ID

14

5 Apple ID

2

6 Health Information

6

7 Media

Summary
This chapter presented the data and information regarding COVID-19 tracking and
tracing applications that were researched and speculated for the features accesses they
request. COVID-19 tracking, and tracing applications request accesses for Bluetooth

20
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connection/pairing Location tracking, contact information, ID, Apple ID, Health
Information, Media, USB Storage, Background apps, Camera, Wi-Fi connection, Full
network access, run automatically at startup, prevent device from sleeping, Phone call,
install shortcuts, and Vibration depending on which one you download. Once the users
grant the access to these applications, they allow the application company to manipulate
the respective features on your phone and use the data retrieved from the features. Some
of the features allow access to very personal and sensitive information like health
information, address, government ID, and location, which in wrong hands, could be
misused to a dangerous extent.
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations
Introduction
Thus far in this research paper, information and data relating to COVID-19 tracking
and tracing mobile applications from all around the world and listed out their region, and
the phone feature accesses they request the user before they can be used. Moreover,
we went a step ahead and analyzed the feature accesses that most mobile applications
request and least and presented this information in a table. All the data research,
tabulation, and analysis will be playing a huge role in building the results, conclusion, and
recommendations. The results, conclusion and recommendations will be presented in this
chapter.
The results section will have the findings that we mentioned in the previous
sections in a concise manner for the purpose of a quick overview. This section will help
the readers to follow through on the researched information and the conclusions that are
drawn from them. The conclusion section will have finally answer questions asked in the
research paper in the beginning with the help of the researched data and their analysis.
Lastly the recommendations section will have educated suggestions to users who
download the COVID-19 tracking and tracing applications in order to protect their privacy
and sensitive data
Conclusion
The data and research findings presented in the previous chapters draw a clear
picture of the reality of COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile applications, in terms of the
phone features and data that they request to access. Especially because mobile phones

61
have become a crucial part of people’s daily lives, it is riskier than ever before to allow
these tracking and tracing applications to access the users’ phone features and personal
data. Moreover, access to network features like Bluetooth connections and location
tracking, can allow attackers to locate and control users’ mobile phones to perform
various malicious tasks by making use of user data and phoner features without the
consent or knowledge of the users. This will not only invade the users’ privacy but also
cause the users to be victims of various criminal activities. Therefore, it is crucial for users
to thoroughly go through the terms of agreement of the mobile applications before
downloading and accepting the terms of COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile
applications in order to get a good idea about what they are signing up for. This will not
only protect users’ data and privacy but will also keep them out of potential criminal
activities that attackers might perform using the users’ mobile devices and data.
Recommendations
Mobile phones have become a big part of our lives today. Especially during the
COVID-19 pandemic, mobile applications like tracking applications as well as other social
media applications are being used in a way higher magnitude as a result of increased
phone time. Although COVID-19 tracking and tracing mobile applications were designed
and created to bring a solution into the pandemic by tracking exact locations and
whereabouts of COVID-19 patients and warning others who don’t have the infection, user
privacy might greatly be at stake. Hence, after studying the data and phone features
access that the mobile applications request, here are some recommendations that might
help one preserve their privacy:
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1. Downloading mobile applications from third party stores or website that do not
clearly mention the data access requests needs to be avoided at all cost.
2. Mobile applications or companies need to be researched before downloading and
using the applications in order to avoid being victims of any negative events or
incidents like recent data breaches in the application company.
3. Mobile application privacy policy in the application download store (Google Play
store, Apple App store) needs to be checked and their terms of agreement and
data access requests need to be read through carefully before downloading the
application.
4. Being mindful of phone features like Bluetooth and location and check to see that
they are turned off when not necessary is vital.
5. Phone application settings need to be checked and managed carefully in order to
make sure usage of features like Bluetooth and location are turned off for
unnecessary applications.
6. Smartphones need to be locked with passwords or other authentication methods
like Face ID and Touch ID in order to prevent potential unauthorized application
downloads.
7. Malicious links in spam emails and websites need to be deleted or closed right
away, in order to prevent automatic download of mobile applications into the
smartphone.
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8. Being mindful of letting people use a personal smartphone is necessary in order
to avoid unauthorized mobile application downloads.
9. Being cautious while selecting preferences on mobile application access request
popups especially in Apple devices that repeatedly ask at certain intervals for
permissions to device Location is important.
10. Educating people who own smartphones about data and privacy protection
practices in order to avoid accidents that threaten user privacy is a must.
11. Promote laws on national level that prohibit the use of consumer data for
unauthorized operations,
By following the above steps and just being generally cautious about what you download
in your smartphone and allow access to data, you can protect your data and privacy and
avoid being victims of incidents like data breaches and leaks.
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